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REASONING ABOUT EFFECTS OF 
CONCURRENT ACTIONS 
CHITrA  BARAL AND MICHAEL  GELFOND 
I> Gelfond and Lifschitz introduce a declarative language ~e' for describing 
effects of actions and describe translations of theories in this language into 
extended logic programs. In this paper we extend the language d and its 
translation to allow reasoning about the effects of concurrent actions. The 
logic programming formalization of situation calculus with concurrent 
actions presented in the paper is of independent interest and may serve as 
a test bed for the investigation of various transformations and logic pro- 
gramming inference mechanisms. © Elsevier Science Inc., 1997 <1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Gelfond and Lifschitz [GL92] introduce a declarative language 5a¢ for describing 
effects of actions and define the semantics of this language based on the notion of 
a finite automaton. The simplicity of the language and its semantics facilitates the 
description of the ontology of actions and contributes to establishing correctness 
(and sometimes completeness) of various logical formalizations of their effects. In 
particular, a theory of action stated in the language of extended logic programs 
(ELP's) [GL90] was described in [GL92] as a translation from a subset of ~¢ and 
proven to be sound w.r.t, the automata based semantics. Kartha [Kar93] recently 
proved soundness and completeness of this semantics with respect to formaliza- 
tions proposed earlier by Pednault [Ped89], Reiter [Rei91], and Baker [Bak91]. 
Although the language za¢ is adequate for formalizing several interesting do- 
mains, its expressive power is rather limited. In particular, every action is assumed 
to be executable in any situation and only one action can be performed at a time. 
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In this paper we expand the syntax and semantics of ~¢ to remove these limitations 
and to allow for a representation of concurrent actions. (For some other recent 
extensions of d see [KL94, BG94b, HT93].) Our  treatment of concurrency in this 
paper is along the lines suggested in [GLR91]. As in [GL92], we translate theories 
in the resulting language ~c  into logic programs and prove correctness of these 
translations. The translations can be viewed as a logic programming counterpart of 
situation calculus [MH69] and are interesting in their own right. 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we define the syntax and 
semantics of the language 5g c. Section 3 describes the translations of  theories from 
d c into logic programs while section 4 illustrates the translations by the way of 
examples. In section 5 we discuss where and how our paper fits into the state of 
current research in "reasoning about actions." Proofs of theorems are given in the 
Appendix. 
2. A LANGUAGE ~c  
2.1. Syntax 
First we will recall the syntax of language ~¢ from [GL92]. 
2.1.1. Syntax o fd .  The alphabet of ~/consists of two disjoint nonempty sets ]£1 
and Ez of symbols, called fluent names and action names. A fluent literal is a fluent 
name possibly preceded by 7 .  
A v-proposition is an expression of the form 
f after a 1 . . . . .  a m, (1) 
where f is a fluent literal, and a 1 . . . . .  am (m >_ 0) are action names. If m = 0, (1) is 
written as 
initially f .  
An e-proposition is an expression of the form 
a causes f if Pl . . . . .  P., (2) 
where a is an action name, and each of f ,  Pl . . . . .  Pn (n >_ 0) is a fluent literal. The 
literals Pl . . . .  , Pn are called preconditions of (2). If n = 0, we write this proposit ion 
as  
a causes f .  
A domain description in ~¢ is a set of v- and e-propositions. 
Z1.2. Syntax o f~.  The syntax of d c differs from the syntax of 5~' only in the 
definition of action names. By an action name of 5g c we mean a non-empty finite 
set {al . . . . .  a n} of  elements of E2. Intuitively, an action name {a i} denotes a unit 
action while an action name a = {a I. . . . .  a n} where n > 1 denotes a compound 
action--a set of unit actions which are performed concurrently and which start and 
stop cotemporaneously. For simplicity we will often identify a unit action name {a i} 
with a o To illustrate the notion of a domain description in ~'c let us consider the 
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following examples from [GLR91]: 
Example 2.1. Mary is lifting a bowl of soup from the kitchen table, while John is 
opening the door to the dining room. 
To represent his story in d c let us consider an alphabet consisting of fluent 
names lifted and opened and two unit actions lift and open. The initial situation is 
described by v-propositions: 
in i t ia l ly  ~ lifted in i t ia l ly  -~ opened 
The effects of the actions can be described by the axioms: 
{ lift} causes  lifted { open} causes  opened. 
The resulting domain description will be denoted by D 1. Intuitively, the effects of 
the two actions of D1 are completely independent and so both lifted and opened 
should hold after the execution of the compound action {lift, open}. In a sense, this 
compound action inherits its effect from its subactions. 
The next example describes actions whose effects are mutually dependent. 
Example 2.2. Whenever Mary tries to lift the bowl with one hand, she spills the 
soup. When she uses both hands, she does not spill the soup. We know that the 
soup is not spilled initially. 
This time let us consider an alphabet consisting of a fluent name spilled and two 
unit actions lift_l and lift_r. The initial situation may be described by a proposi- 
tion: 
in i t ia l ly  ~ spilled 
and the effects of actions are represented by propositions: 
{ lift_l} causes spilled 
{ lift_r} causes spilled 
{lift_l, lift_r} causes  --7 spilled i f  --7 spilled. 
The resulting domain description will be denoted by D 2. The last effect law 
explicitly cancels inheritance of spilled by the compound action {lift_l, lift_r}. 
Domain descriptions in d c are used together with the following informal 
assumptions: 
(a) Changes in the values of fluents can only be caused by execution of actions 
whose names belong to the alphabet of the language of D. 
(b) Effects of an action are either directly specified by the e-propositions in the 
domain description D or inherited from its sub-actions. 
Development of the precise semantics of domain descriptions of 5~" c which incorpo- 
rates these informal assumptions i the subject of the next section. 
2.2. Semantics 
To describe the semantics of ~¢'c, we will define "models" of a domain description, 
and when a v-proposition is "true" in a model. If a v-proposition P is true in all 
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models  of a domain  descr ipt ion D,  we say that D entails P. As defined in [GL92], a 
state is a set of f luent names; given a fluent name f and a state ~r, we say that f 
holds in o" if f ~ or; ~ f holds in o- if f q~ or. 
A transitit, efunction is a mapping (I) of a subset of the set of pairs (a, or), where 
a is an action name and o- is a state, into the set of states. 1 As in [GL92], a 
structure is a pair  (~r0,(I)), where o- 0 is a state (called the initial state of the 
structure),  and d/) is a transit ion function. We say that a sequence of  action names 
a I . . . .  , a m is executable in a structure M = (or0, ~)  if for every 1 < k < m 
cI)(ak, (I)(ak_ 1 . . . . .  el)( a l ,  cro) . . .  ))  
is defined. The result ing state will be denoted by M (aa . . . . . .  m). 
We say that a v-proposit ion (1) is true (false) in a structure M if 
1. a~ . . . . .  a,~ is executable in M, 
2. f holds (does not hold) in M ~ .......... ) 
In part icular,  the proposi t ion " in i t ia l ly  f "  is true in M iff f holds in the initial 
state of M. 
We say that execution of an action a in a state cr immediately causes a fluent 
l iteral f if 
there is an e-proposit ion "a causes f if p~ . . . . .  p , "  from the domain  D such that 
for every i, 1 < i _< n, Pi holds in or. 
We say that execution of  an action a in a state o- causes a fluent l iteral f if 
1. a immediately causes f ,  or 
2. a inherits the effect f from its subsets in or, i.e., there is a bca ,  such that 
execution of b in or immediately causes f and there is no c such that b c c _c a 
and execution of c in cr immediate ly  causes -7 f .  
Let a be an action and ~r be a state and consider: 
E+(a ,  ~r) = { f : f  is a f luent name and execution of a in ~ causes f} ,  
E -  (a ,  cr ) = { f : f is a f luent name and execution of a in cr causes -7 f} .  
A structure (o-0,~)  will be cal led a model of a domain  descr ipt ion D if the 
fol lowing condit ions are satisfied: 
1. Every v-proposit ion from D is true in (~r0,qb); 
2. For  every action a = {a 1 . . . . .  a n} and every state o- 
(i) if E+(a, o') hE - (a ,  (r) = Q3 then (I)(a, ~r) is def ined and 
cl)(a, o-) = o-tO E + (a ,  o - ) \E - (a ,  o-).  
(ii) otherwise 4)(a, or) is undefined. 
Observation 2.1. There can be at most one transit ion function • satisfying 
condit ions ( i)-( i i ) .  Consequently,  dif ferent models  of  the same domain descr ipt ion 
can differ only by their  initial states. 
1 Recall that in the definition of a transition function in the semantics of .w', q~ must be defined on 
the set of all such pairs. 
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Example 2.3. Consider the domain description D 1 from Example 1, the initial state 
o- 0 = Q and the transition function • defined as follows: 
Oh(open, o') = o'U {opened} 
alP(lift, o') = ~r U {lifted} 
¢b ( { open, lift}, o" ) = or U { opened, lifted}. 
It is easy to see that the structure (~r0,~) is the only model of the domain 
description D 1 and therefore D 1 entails v-propositions opened after  {open, lift} and 
lifted after  {open, lift}. 
Example 2.4. Consider a domain description D s containing three unit actions 
paint, close and open, and two fluents, opened and painted. The effects of  these 
actions are defined by the following e-propositions: 
close causes  ~ opened 
open causes  opened 
paint causes  painted. 
Let a transition function • be defined as follows: 
• (~,  o)  = ,~ 
cb( paint, ~r ) = or U { painted} 
(close, ~r ) = ~r \ { opened} 
• (open, o-) = ~rU {opened} 
• ({ paint, close}, ~r ) = or U { painted} \{  opened} 
~({ paint, open}, o" ) = or U { painted} u {opened}. 
Notice, that for a pair (A,  or)where or is an arbitrary state and {open, close} GA, 
is undefined. 
It is easy to see that any structure (o-, ~)where  ~r c {opened, painted} is a model 
of  D 3 and that D 3 has no other models. 
For a domain description D and its model M= (o-0,~), if qb(a, or) is undefined 
for some action a and state o-, we can consider it to mean that a is not possible in 
a situation whose state is ~r. We can use this to specify conditions when an action 
is possible and when it is not. The following example makes it clear. 
Example 2.5. Let us consider a variant of  Example 2, where Mary is unable to lift a 
heavy box with one hand, while she can lift it using both hands. 
Let us consider the alphabet consisting of special fluent names t and another 
fluent heavy and two unit actions lift l and lift_r. To say that it is impossible to 
lift a heavy box with only the left hand we have the following e-propositions in our 
domain description: 
{lift_l} causes  -1 t i f  heavy 
{lift_l} causes t i f  heavy 
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Similarly, to say that it is impossible to lift a heavy box with the right hand we have 
the following e-proposition in our domain description 
{lift_r} causes -~ t if heavy 
{lift_r} causes t if heathy. 
In general we have the assumption that if an action is not possible then unless 
otherwise specified, a bigger action containing that action is also not possible. This 
is automatically captured by the fact that compound actions inherit effects from 
their subactions. 
But to say that it is possible to lift a heavy box using both hands we need to have 
the following in our domain description: 
{ lift_l, lift_r} causes t
It is easy to see that if heavy ~ or, then ~(lift_l,  o') and dP(lift_r, or) are undefined 
while ~p({lifi_l, ift_r}, o') is defined. 
A domain description is consistent if it has a model, and complete if it has 
exactly one model. For instance, domain descriptions D 1 and D 3 from Examples 1 
and 4 are consistent, D 1 is complete, and a domain description containing the 
v-proposition initially f and initially -7 f is inconsistent. 
It is interesting to compare our new semantics with that defined in [GL92]. The 
comparison of course is only possible for the domain descriptions not containing 
names for compound actions. But, as demonstrated by the following example, even 
in this case the new semantics is somewhat more powerful than the old one. 
Example 2.6. Consider a domain description D 4 containing an action name a, a 
fluent name f and two e-propositions 
a causes f a causes -7 f .  
According to the semantics from [GL92] D is inconsistent while it is easy to check 
that M= (Q,~)where  ~P(A, o-) is undefined for all actions A, is a model of D. 
The following proposition shows that for descriptions consistent in the sense of 
[GL92] both semantics coincide. Models of D in the sense of [GL92] will be called 
s-models. 
Proposition 2.1. Let D be a domain description ot containing compound actions and 
assume that D has an s-model. Let M = ( ~r ,4p) and M* = ( tr, ~* ) where ~P* is ~P 
restricted to unit actions. 
Then 
(i) M is a model o lD  iff M* is an s-model of D and 
(ii) for every s-model N o lD there is a model M o lD  such that N = M*. 
PROOF. Directly follows from the definition of models and s-models. [] 
3. FROM ~c TO LOGIC PROGRAMS 
3.1. Extended Logic Programs and Di~junctiue Logic Programs 
In this section we review necessary definitions and results from the theory of 
declarative logic programming. In addition to the negation as failure operator not 
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[Cla78] of standard logic programming languages we consider two other connec- 
tives: classical (strong, explicit) negation (-1) of [GL90] and epistemic disjunction 
or of [GL91]. Both connectives are needed to allow representation f various forms 
of incomplete information. There is no complete agreement on the nature and 
semantics of these connectives and their interrelation with negation as failure. 
Several different proposals were discussed in the literature (see, for instance, 
Minker et al. [LMR92], Pereira et al. [PCA90], Dix [Dix91], Przymusinski [Prz90], 
Gelfond and Lifschitz [GL90]). We will follow [GL91]. Applicability of this ap- 
proach to representation f incomplete information is discussed in [BG94a, Gel94]. 
A disjunctive logic program (DLP) is a collection of rules of the form 
l I or .. .  o r l  k ~---lk+ 1 . . . . .  l m, not lm+ l . . . . .  not l  n, (1) 
where k > 0, and each l i is a literal, i.e., an atom possibly preceded by -7, and not 
is the negation as failure operator. Expression on the left hand (right hand) side of 
is called the head (the body) of the rule. Both, the head and the body of (1) can 
be empty. Unless otherwise stated, we assume that rules with variables are used as 
shorthand for the set consisting of all their ground instantiations. Intuitively the 
rule can be read as: if lk+ 1 . . . . .  l m are believed and it is not true that lm+ 1 . . . . .  In 
are believed then at least one of {ll . . . . .  l k} is believed. For a rule r of the form (1) 
the sets {l l , . . . , lk},  {lk+ 1 . . . . .  lm} and {Ira+ 1 . . . . .  l n} are referred to as head(r) ,  
pos( r )  and neg(r )  respectively, l i t(r) stands for head(r )  O pos( r )  o neg(r).  For any 
DLP H, head(H)  = Ur ~ n head(r) .  For a set of predicates S, L i t (S )  denotes the set 
of literals with predicates from S. For a DLP H, L i t (H)  denotes the set of literals 
with predicates from the language of II. When it is clear from the context we write 
Lit instead of L i t (H) .  For sets of literals X and Y, we say Y is complete in X if for 
every literal l ~ X, at least one of the literals l, ] belongs to Y. The literals l and i 
are said to be complementary to each other and are referred to as complementary 
literals. 
A program determines a collection of answer sets - -sets  of ground literals 
representing possible beliefs of the program. 
Definition 3.1 [GL91]. Let II be a disjunctive logic program. For any set S of 
ground literals, let H s be the logic program obtained from H by deleting 
(i) each rule that has a formula not I in its body with l ~ S, and 
(ii) all formulas of the form not I in the bodies of the remaining rules. 
Definition 3.2. An  answer set of a disjunctive logic program II not containing not is 
a minimal (in a sense of set-theoretic nclusion) subset S of Lit  such that 
(i) for any rule l 1 or  " "  o r  I k ~-- lk+ 1 . . . . .  l m from H, if lk+ 1 . . . . .  lm ~ S, then for 
some i, O<i  <k ,  l i~S;  
(ii) if S contains a pair of complementary literals, then S = Lit. 
A set S of literals is an answer set of an arbitrary disjunctive logic program H 
if S is an answer set of l°I s. 
A program 2 is consistent if it has an answer set not containing contradictory 
literals. As was shown in [Gel94] if a program is consistent then all of its answer 
2 Henceforth by "program" we mean a disjunctive logic program. 
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sets are consistent. A ground literal l is entailed by a DLP [1 (denoted by II ~ l) if 
it belongs to all of its answer sets. When all the rules in a DLP have k = 0 then it is 
referred to as an extended logic program [GL90, PW89]. 
In our further discussion we will need the following proposition about DLP's: 
Proposition 3.1 [BG94a]. For any answer set So fa  disjunctive logic program 11: 
(a) For any ground instance of a rule of the type (1) from H, if 
{lk+ 1 . . . . .  lm} cSand 
{lm+l . . . . .  l.} nS=O 
then there exists an i, 1 < i <_ k such that l i ~ S. 
(b) I f  S is a consistent answer set of II and l i ~ S for some 1 <_ i <<_ k then there 
exists a ground instance of a rule of the type (1) from II such that 
{lk+l . . . . .  Ira} c_S, and 
{lm+ 1 . . . . .  l,} nS=Q,  and 
{I, . . . .  ,lk} AS  = {li}. 
We now review the definitions of "splitting" and "signing" which we use to 
analyze properties of the programs obtained by translating a domain description. 
Definition 3.3 [Tur94]. Let 1I be a DLP such that no rule in it has an empty head. 
Let S be a set of literals in the language of II such that no literals in head(11) 
appears complemented in head(it). Let S denote L i t \S .  S is said to be a 
signing for II if each r ~ 11 satisfies the following two conditions: 
(i) head(r) Upos(r) c S and neg(r) c S, or 
head(r) U pos(r) c,~ and neg(r) c S 
(ii) If head(r) c S, then head(r) is a singleton. 
If a program has a signing, we say that it is signed. 
Definition 3.4 [Tur94]. Let II be a program. If S is a signing for [1, then 
hs(11) = ( r ~ [l : head( r ) cS},  
hg( I I )  = {r~ II:  head(r) cS}.  
Proposition 3.2 (Based on the restricted monotonicity theorem in [Tur94]). Let I11 
and 112 be programs in the same language, both with signing S, If h$(I-I a) c_ hg(112) 
and hs(H 2) _ hs(IIa), then 
i f  111 ~ I and l ~ S then [I 2 ~ l. 
Definition 3.5 (Splitting set) [LT]. A splitting set for a program 13 is any set U of 
literals such that, for every rule r ~ 11, if head(r) • U 4= • then lit(r) c U. If U 
is a splitting set for l-I, we also say that U splits II. The set of rules r ~ II such 
that l i t ( r )c  U is called the bottom of II relative to the splitting set U and 
denoted by by(it) .  The subprogram [1 \bu( I I )  is called the top of 11 relative 
to U. 
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Definition 3. 6 (Partial evaluation) [LT]. The partial evaluation of a program Iq with 
splitting set U w.r.t, a set of literals X is the program eu(H, X)  defined as 
follows. For each rule r ~ II such that: 
(pos(r )  n U) cXA (neg(r) n U) nX= 
put in e~(II ,  X )  all the rules r' that satisfy the following property: 
head( r' ) = head(r), pos( r' ) = pos( r ) \ U, neg( r' ) = neg( r ) \ U 
Definition 3. 7 (Solution) [LT]. Let U be a splitting set for a program 17. A solution 
to I I  w.r.t. U is a pair (X ,  Y)  of literals such that: 
• X is an answer set for bu(H); 
• Y is an answer set for e~( I I \bu( I I ) ,X) ;  
• XU Y is consistent. 
Lemma 3.1 (Splitting Lemma) [LT]. Let U be a splitting set for a program II. A set A 
of literals is a consistent answer set for II if and only if A = X g Y for some solution 
( X, Y ) to II w.r.t. U. 
3.2. The Translation 7r and Its Properties 
In this section we describe the translation ~- from domain descriptions to DLP's 
and discuss its properties. The translated program 7rD of a domain description D, 
uses variables of three sorts: situation variables S, S', . . . .  fluent variables, F, F',  . . . .  
and action variables A, A', . . . .  3 We also need a sort for fluent literals whose terms 
are of the form f or f where f is a term of the type fluent and f denotes the fluent 
term g if f = ~ g and denotes --1 f otherwise. The language includes the situation 
constant So, and the fluent names and action names of D, that become object 
constants of the corresponding sorts. There are also some predicate and function 
symbols; their sorts will be clear from their use in the rules below. Of special 
importance is a function symbol { } which will be used to form terms of the action 
type and a function result used to form the terms of the type situation. 
The translated programs zrD consists of the following translations of the 
individual propositions from D along with inertia axioms, inheritance axioms and 
axioms on the full awareness about the initial situation. 4 
3 Using a sorted language implies that all atoms in the programs are formed in accordance with the 
syntax of sorted predicate logic. Moreover, when we speak of an instance of a rule, we assume that the 
terms substituted for variables are of the appropriate sorts. 
4 Turner [Tur94] called it "complete initial situation axioms." We prefer to call it "full awareness 
about the initial situation axioms" which means that the program is aware of the value of all the fluents 
in the language in the initial situation. 
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1. Inertia axioms: 
( la )  
( lb )  
holds(F, result(A, S ) ) ~ holds(F, S ), 
not may_imm_cause( A, if, S ) , 
atomic(A), not undefined( A, S) 
holds(F, result(A, S ) ) ~ -1 holds(F, S ), 
not may_imm_cause( A, F, S ) , 
atomic(A), not undefined( A, S) 
These rules are motivated by the "common-sense law of inertia" [MH69], accord- 
ing to which truth values of fluents are normally not changed by actions. The rules 
( la ) - ( lb)  allow us to apply the law of inertia in reasoning "from the past to the 
future": The first--when a fluent is known to be true in the past, and the 
second--when it is known to be false. The auxiliary predicate may immcause is 
essentially an "abnormality predicate" [McC86]. The axioms differ from those 
suggested in [GL92] only in the use of predicate "atomic" to restrict the inertia 
rules to unit actions and the predicate "undefined" to restrict inertia rules to 
executable actions. 
2. Translating v-propositions: A v-proposition " f  after a l , . . .  , am" is translated as 
(2) *-noth(f , [a 1 .. . . .  am] ) , 
where [a 1 . . . . .  a m] stands for the ground term 
result(am, result(am-i,..., result( ax , So)... )), 
and the atom h(pn, s) denotes the literal holds(pn, s) if pn is a positive literal and 
the literal ~ holds(Ip, l,s) if p,  is a negative literal. Also, for any fluent f,  Ifl =f  
and I--1 f l  =f .  
3. Translating e-propositions: The translation of an e-proposition "a causes f if 
p~ .. . . .  p," consists of 
(3a) may_imm_cause(a,f,S) ~noth(p l ,S  ) . . . . .  noth(pn,S ) 
(3b) cause(a , f ,S )~h(p l ,S  ) . . . . .  h(pn,S) 
where, holds( Pi, S) is a literal complementary to holds(pi, s). 
Intuitively, may immcause(a, f ,s)  means that if action a is executed in 
situation s then f may become true as a direct effect of the action a. It is used in 
disabling the inertia rules (1) in the cases when f can be affected by a. It is also 
used in defining undefined in rule (3d). Intuitively, cause(a, f, s) means that if 
action a is executed in situation s then f will be true as a direct effect of the 
action a. It is used in the rule (3c) below. 
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The Effect Axiom (3c) and axioms (3d) and (3e) are defined as follows: 
(3c) 
(3d) 
(3e) 
h( F, result( A ,  S ) ) ~ cause( A,  F, S ) , not undefined( A,  S) 
undefined( A,  S) ~- may_imm_cause( A,  F, S ) , 
may_imm_cause( A,  F, S) 
undefined( A,  res ( B, S ) ) ~ undefined( B, S) 
The effect axiom allows us to prove that f will hold after a, if the preconditions are 
satisfied. 
Axiom (3c) differs from the one suggested in [GL92] only by allowing terms for 
compound actions and by using the predicate "undefined." The next axioms are 
new. They describe how the effects of individual actions are related to the effects 
of these actions performed concurrently. 
4. Inheritance axioms: 
(4a) 
(4b) 
(4c) 
(4d) 
(4e) 
holds ( F, result ( A ,  S) ) ~- subset( B, A ), holds ( F, Result ( B, S ) ) , 
not noninh( F, A,  S ) , not undefined ( A,  S) 
-~ holds ( F, result ( A,  S) ) ~ subset( B, A ) , ~ holds (F, result ( B, S) ), 
not noninh( if, A,  S ) , not undefined( A,  S) 
cancels( X ,  Y, F, S) ~ subset( X,  Z ), subseteq( Z, Y ) , cause( Z, if, S) 
noninh( F, A,  S) ~ subseteq( U, A ) , may_imm_cause( U, if, S) 
not cancels( U, A,  if, S) 
undefined(A, S) ,-- nonihn( F, A,  S ), nonihn( ff , A ,  S) 
Intuitively, cancels(x,y,f ,s)  means that an action z, xczc_y ,  causes f thus 
cancelling the inheritance of the effect f by the action y from its subaction x. 
Intuitively, noninh(f, x, s) means that the action x does not inherit the effect f 
from its subactions in situation s. The noninheritance axioms in (4) are essential 
for the correct treatment of concurrent actions. According to these axioms the 
effects of compound actions are normally inherited from the effects of their 
components. 
5. Full awareness about the initial situation rule: 
(5) holds( F, so) or -~ holds( F, so) 
6. Defining subseteq and atomic: For any two actions a and b we add 
subseteq( a, b) if a c_ b, subset(a, b) if a c b, --7 subseteq( a, b) if a ff£ b, -~ subset(a, b) 
if a ~ b, atomic(a) if a is a singleton, and ~ atomic(a) otherwise. Of course this 
would lead to a very large program. 
To make the program more practical we can represent a set of atomic actions as 
a list (other representations are also possible). In that case subset and atomic can 
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be defined using the following rules: 
-7 subseteq( A ,  B) ~ member( X ,  A ) , not member( X,  B) 
subseteq( A,  B) ~ not -~ subseteq( A ,  B) 
eq( X,  X )  
-1 atomic(X) *-- member( Y, X ), member( Z, X ) ,  not eq( Y, Z)  
atomic(X) ~ not -7 atomic(X) 
subset( X ,  Y )  ~ subseteq( X ,  Y ) , not subseteq( Y, X )  
For a domain description D, the program 7rD consists of the rules (la), (lb), (2), 
(3a)-(3e), (4a)-(4e), (5) and (6). 
Observation 3.1. Since in rrD we assume full awareness about the initial state 
(5), may_imm_cause and causes are equivalent and one can be replaced by the 
other in the bodies of rules in ~-D without affecting its answer sets. 
Observation 3.2. The program rrD can be split (see Definition 5) using the 
splitting set consisting of Lit({atomic, subset, subseteq, eq}). It is easy to see that the 
bottom part consists of the rules (6) and the top part consists of the rest. It is easy 
to see that the bottom part has a unique answer set. Hence by virtue of Theorem 
3.1 in the rest of the paper we only consider the top part of the program rrD 
partially evaluated w.r.t, the unique answer set of the bottom part. 
Theorem 3.1 (Soundness and completeness of rr). Let D be an arbitrary domain 
description and P =f  after a 1 . . . . .  a n be any v-proposition in the language of D 
such that al , . . . ,  a n is executable in any model of D. Then rrD ~ h(f,  [a l , . . . ,  a n ]) 
iff D ~ p.5 
The result shows that general-purpose nonmonotonic system of disjunctive logic 
programs has sufficient power for modeling reasoning about domain descriptions of 
a¢c. Unfortunately, at the moment there is no well-understood query answering 
mechanism that can answer queries for arbitrary disjunctive databases. For some 
results in this direction see for instance [Wat94, BEP94]. 
In the next subsection we consider two other translations of a domain descrip- 
tion into subclasses of logic programs for which inference mechanisms are much 
better understood. These translations are however weaker than rr and therefore 
are incomplete in general. 
3.3. The Translation 7r' and Its Properties 
Consider the program ~r'D which differs from 7rD by having (2') 
(2') h( f , [a l  . . . . .  am]) ~-- 
instead of (2). Rules of the form 2 are referred to as constraints. 
s Notice that the first occurrence of ~ denotes entailment w.r.t, logic programs while the second 
denotes entailment w.r.t, domain descriptions in agc. 
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Observation 3.3. Since in 7r'D we assume full awareness about the initial state (5), 
we can replace may_imm_cause by cause in the body of the rules (la), (lb), 
(3d), and (4d) and replace cause by may_ immcause  in the rule (4c) without 
affecting its answer sets. 
Perhaps surprisingly, this translation is weaker than 7r. 
Example 3.1. Consider the following domain description D: 
initially -7 f 
a causes f if p 
b causes -7 f if p 
{a, b} causes f if -~ p 
f after { a, b}. 
There are two candidates for the initial state of a model of D: tr 0 = { } and 
o-~ = {p}. Let • be the transition function in the models of D. It is easy to see that 
qb({a,b},•) = {f}, while O~({a,b},{p}) is undefined. It is easy to show that M '= 
(tr~,qb) is not a model of D and hence, M=(o-0 ,~)  is the only model (by 
Observation 2.l) of D. Hence, D ~ initially ~ p. 
Now let us consider the programs 7rD and 7r'D. It is easy to show that 7rD has 
two answer sets A and A', where 
{ ~ holds(p, So), holds(f, [{a, b}] )} cA  and 
{holds(p, So), holds(f, [{ a, b}])} cA'.  
Consider 7rD. It is easy to show that it has an answer set that contains 
{ ~ holds(p, so), holds(f, [{a, b}])}, but it does not have any answer set that contains 
holds(p, So). This is because in the second case by having holds(p, So), the answer 
set is forced to have noninh(f, {a, b}, s o) and noninh(-~ f,{a, b}, So). Thus there is 
no way to have holds(f,[{a, b}]) in that answer set. But then it violates the 
constraint obtained in step (2) and hence it will not be an answer set. 
Hence, in this example the unique answer set of ~rD correspond to the unique 
model of D, while 7r'D has an extra answer set. As a result, ~rD ~ -~ holds(p, so) 
while 7r'D ~ ~ holds(p, So). 
Although as shown in the above example ~-' may not lead to a complete 
translation, we show below that it is sound. 
Theorem 3.2 (Soundness of 7r'). Let D be an arbitrary domain description and P =f  
after a I . . . . .  a n be any v-proposition in the language of D such that a I . . . . .  a n is 
executable in any model of D. If rr'D ~ rr'P then D ~ P. 
Now we describe a large class of domain descriptions for which translations 7r 
and ~-' are equivalent. We need the following: 
Definition 3.8. We say that an action a is associated with a domain description D if 
a is a subset (not necessarily proper) of some action which occurs in some 
proposition of D. A domain description D will be called well-founded (w.r.t. 
actions) if for any model M = (tr 0, ~)  of D, any action a, associated with D, and 
any state tr of M, ~(a ,  ~r) is defined. 
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Notice that the domain description D from Example 1 is not well-founded since 
the action {a, b} is associated with D but dp({a, b},{p}), where • is the transition 
function from its model, is undefined. 
Theorem 3.3. For any consistent well-founded omain description D the programs 7r D 
and 7r'D have the same answer sets. 
Corollary 3.1. For any consistent well-founded omain description D the program rr'D 
is complete w.r.t. D, i.e., for any v-proposition p of the form f after a 1 . . . . .  a n in 
the language o lD  if a 1 . . . . .  a n is executable in D then 7r'D ~ ~'p iff D ~ p. 
Computationally, 7r' is slightly easier to deal with than 7r. This is due to the fact 
that the program rr'D does not contain rules with empty heads which eliminates 
one computational difficulty. 
Answers to queries to the program 7r'D can be computed using the program 
ELMO developed by Watson [Wat94]. ELMO is built on top of the SLG program 
by Chen and Warren [WC93] which answers queries for "classical" logic programs 
without -~ and or under the stable model semantics [GL88]. ELMO works 
correctly for a large class of disjunctive programs with no empty heads. It is easy to 
show that for any D, 7r'D belongs to this class. As was shown by Inoue [Ino91] (see 
also recent paper [LT94]) these programs are equivalent o so called abductive 
logic programs which opens the possibility of answering queries in 7r'D based on 
abductive reasoning. 
There are two substantial sources of inefficiency in ELMO. The first one is the 
presence of disjunctions. The second is the fact that in general, even without 
disjunction, the query answering methods for programs with negation as failure 
under stable model semantics are not efficient. This observation leads to the next 
translation ~rf which gives us programs with properties that make them efficiently 
computable, but much less complete. 
3.4. The Translation 7rf and Its Properties 
The program ~rfD is obtained from 7r'D by removing all the disjunctions from 
7r'D. The program loses awareness of some of the fluents of D and concentrates 
instead only on those whose truth values in the initial situation are known. If the 
values of many fluents in the initial situation are unknown, this, of course, 
substantially weakens the program. But at the same time makes it much more 
efficient. This is due to the fact that 7rfD has neither of the computational 
difficulties present in 7r'D. Disjunctions are obviously eliminated, but moreover, 
the resulting program is easily reducible to a so called acyclic program 6 for which 
the standard computational mechanism of "classical" logic programming, called 
SLDNF resolution is sound and complete [AB91]. Also, most of the proposed 
semantics for negation as failure coincide for acyclic programs, and hence no 
special difficulties related to stable model semantics are present. The resulting 
6 It was originally called "w locally hierarchical programs" by Cavedon [Cav891 and renamed "acyclic 
programs" by Apt and Bezem in [AB90] where the authors prove important properties of such 
programs. 
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program was run on a simple extension of Prolog which allows for treatment of -~. 
It was also used for constructing and proving the correctness of simple planners 
capable of producing plans with concurrent actions. 
In Observation 3.1 and 3.3 we observed that in ¢rD and 7r'D we can replace 
may_ immcause  by cause in the body of the rules (la), (lb), (3d) and (4d) without 
affecting its answer sets. Such is not the case for ~r/D. The following example 
explains the need of having causes instead of may_imm_cause in the body of the 
rule (4c) in the program 7r/D. 
Example 3.2. Consider the following domain description D: 
initially -~ f 
{a, c} causes f 
{a,b,c} causes ~f  i fp .  
Consider rfD. Suppose we have may_imm_cause in the body of the rule defining 
cancels. Then we would conclude ~ holds(f, [c]) using inertia (w.r.t. c). Then using 
inheritance we would conclude that ~ holds(f, [{a, b, c}]). Since it is possible that p 
is false in the initial state our conclusion of ~ holds(f,[{a,b,c}]) will be un- 
intuitive. This is avoided by having causes instead of may_ immcause ,  in the body 
of the rule defining cancels. 
Theorem 3.4 (Soundness of ~-f w.r.t. 7r'). Let D be an arbitrary domain description 
and P =f  aftera 1. . . . .  a n be any v-proposition in the language of D such that 
a~ . . . . .  a n is executable in any model o lD.  ~'D ~ 7r'P if 7rfD ~ 1rfP. 
PROOV. (i) It is easy to see that the set S = Lit{may_imm_cause, undefined, non- 
inh}) is a signing of the program 7r'D and 7rfD. 
(ii) Hence using the restricted monotonicity theorem (Proposition 3.2) we have 
that for literals with the predicates holds and -~ holds, the program ~rfD is sound 
with respect o 7r'D, and hence w.r.t.D. [] 
To describe the class of domain descriptions for which ~-f is complete we 
introduce a notion of strongly complete domain description. 
Definition 3.9. A domain description D is called strongly complete if for any fluent 
in the language of D, initially f or initially -7 f belongs to D. 
Theorem 3.5. For any consistent and strongly complete domain description D, the 
programs ~r/D and ~r'D have the same answer sets. 
PROOF. Directly using Lemma 5.1 in the Appendix. [] 
Corollary 3.2. For any consistent, strongly complete and well-founded omain descrip- 
tion D, 7r/ is complete w.r.t. D. 
In the following example we show that 7r/ is weaker than ~-'. 
Example 3.3. Consider the following domain description D: 
initially ~ f 
a causes f if p 
b causes f if ~ p 
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It is easy to see that 7r'D will have two answer sets, one containing {holds(p, So), 
holds(f, [a]), holds(f, [{a, b}])} and another containing { -~ holds(p, So), holds(f, 
[b]),holds(f,[{a,b}])}. Hence, 7r'D ~holds(f,[{a,b}]). It is easy to see that 1rfD 
holds(f, [{a, b}]). 
3.5. Relating 7r, It' and 7r/ to Earlier Translations of ~¢ 
Since ~¢ was introduced in [GL92] several transitions of it to logic programming 
based formalisms have been suggested in the literature. In particular, Gelfond and 
Lifschitz [GL92] give a sound (but not complete) translation of ~¢ to extended logic 
programs; Turner [Tur94] gives a sound and complete translation to disjunctive 
logic programs; Denecker and De Schreye [DDS93] give a sound and complete 
translation to abductive logic programs (see also Dung [Dun93]); and Thielscher 
and Holldobler [HT93] give a sound and complete translation to equational logic 
programs. 
Proposition 2.1, together with Theorems 3.3 from the previous ection allow us 
to rigorously compare our new formalizations with the ones mentioned above. 
Obviously for consistent domain descriptions of ~¢ the corresponding domain 
description in ~ has an s-model and by Proposition 2.1 it is well-founded and 
therefore both, 7r and 7r' are conservative xtensions of the programs from 
[Tur94], [DDS93], [HT93], [Dun93]. Since these formalizations use different lan- 
guages with different semantics, establishing this fact directly, without he use of ~¢ 
and d c, will be probably more difficult. 
Before 5g was introduced there were several works (which includes [AB90, 
EK89, Eva89]) that "reasoned about actions" using logic programs. In [AB90], Apt 
and Bezem consider the case when there is complete information about the initial 
situation. If we consider only such domain descriptions then our ~r r is an extension 
of Apt and Bezem's formalization. This can be easily shown using Theorem 3.5 and 
Proposition 2.1. 
4. SOME DOMAIN DESCRIPT IONS AND THEIR TRANSLATIONS 
Example 4.1 (Independent actions). Consider the domain description D 1 from 
Example 1 
initially -~ lifted 
initially -~ opened 
{lift} causes lifted 
{open} causes opened 
D1. 
In Example 3 we have shown that the domain description D 1 entails the v-proposi- 
tions "lifted after {lift, open}" and "opened after {lift, open}". Let us demonstrate 
that the translation of these propositions i entailed by ~rfD 1. For that purpose let 
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us notice that the following rules belong to 7rfD 1. 
X1 -, holds(lifted, So) 
X2 ~ holds(opened, so) 
X3 holds(lifted, [ { lift } ] ) 
X4 holds(opened, [{open}] ) ,-- 
X5 may_imm_cause( {open}, opened, S) 
X6 may_imm_cause( { lift}, lifted, S) ,-- 
X7  noninh( ~ opened, X, S) ~- subseteq( { open} , X ) , 
may_imm_cause( { open}, opened, S) , 
not cancels( {open} , X, opened, S) 
X8 noninh ( ~ lifted, X, S) ,-- subseteq( { lift}, X ), 
may_imm_cause( { lift}, lifted, S ) , 
not cancels( {lift } , X, lifted, S) 
c zrfD~. 
This rules X1 and X2 are obtained in Step (2'). The rules X3 and X4 are obtained 
by partial evaluation of rules obtained in Step (3c). The rules X5 and X6 are 
obtained in Step (3a). The rules X7 and X8 are obtained by considering the rules 
obtained in Step (4d) and selecting those instances whose body contains a 
may_imm_cause atom that unifies with either X5 or X6. 
Now, notice that D 1 is consistent (see Example 3) and therefore, by the 
Soundness Theorem, 7rfD1 has a consistent answer set. Let A be an arbitrary 
answer set of ~fD~. According to the inheritance axiom 4.a and Proposition 3.1, to 
show that holds(lifted, [{lift, open}])~A it suffices to show that 
(a) holds(lifted, [lift]) ~A while 
(b) noninh( lifted, {lift, open}, so) ~ A. 
(a) follows immediately from X3. Now (b) is the immediate consequence of 
Proposition 3.1, and the fact that noninh(lifted, {lift, open}, so) does not occur in the 
head of any ground instance of a rule from ~rfD 1 whose body has a 
may_imm_cause atom that unifies with either X5 or X6. Similar argument can be 
used to show that 7rfD 1 entails holds(opened, [{lift, open}]). 
In the following example we show how our formalism handles the case when the 
effect of a compound action cancels the effect of the atomic actions. 
Example 4.2 (Dependent actions: Cancellation). Consider a slight modification of 
the domain description D 2 of Example 2. 
in i t ia l ly  has_water } 
in i t ia l ly  -~ splitted 
{lift_l} causes spilled i f  has_water D 2 
{ lift_r} causes spilled i f  has_water 
{lift_l, lift_r} causes  -~ spilled 
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It is easy to see that D 2 entails 
( a) -1 spilled af ter  {lift_r, lift_l}. 
7rfD 2 entails the translation of (a) since it contains the rule 
holds( --1 spilled, [{ lift_r, lift_l}] ) *-- 
obtained from e-proposition 
{ lift_l, lift_r} causes  ~ spilled 
from D 2, 
To see why the Inheritance axiom does not cause inconsistency by inheriting 
that holds(spilled, {lift_l, lift_r}]) is true, it suffices to notice that 
noninh(spilled, {lift_l, lift_r}, s o) is entailed by 7rD 2 . 
The effects of compound actions are cancelled in essentially the same way. 
Consider a domain description D2.1 obtained from D 2 by adding an e-propo- 
sition 
{flip, lift r, lift_l} causes  spilled if has_water. 
7rfO2.1 will contain the rules: 
holds (spilled, [{ flip, lift_ r, lift_ l} ] ) ~ cause ({ flip, lift_ r, lift_ l} , spilled, s o ) 
cause ( { flip, lift_ r, lift_ l} , spilled, S ) ~ holds ( has__ water, S) 
noninh( --1 spilled, X ,  S) ~ subseteq( {flip, lift_r, lift_l}, X ) , 
may_imm_cause( { flip, lift_r, lift_l}, spilled, S ) , 
not caneels( { flip, lift_r, lift_l}, X ,  spilled, S ) . 
These rules will make the program entail 
noninh( -1 spilled, {flip, lift_r, lift_l}, S) 
which blocks the inheritance axioms (4.b) and hence {flip, lift_r, lift_l} does not 
inherit "--1 spilled" from {lift_r, lift_l}. 
In the next example we show how to represent a compound action whose sub- 
actions have conflicting effects. 
Example 4.3 (Conflicting subactions). Consider the domain description D 3 of 
Example 4 
close causes  ~ opened] 
open causes  opened }D 3. 
paint causes  painted ) 
Since for any state o- the transition function dO of D 3 is undefined on 
({open, close},~r) the effect of performing "close" and "open" concurrently is 
unknown. Accordingly, no information about the situation [{open, close}] is entailed 
by ~-fD 3. To show that this is indeed the case let us notice that the following rules 
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belong to "n'fD3: 
Z1 --1 holds(opened, [{close} ]) *-- 
Z2 holds(opened, [{open}] )
Z3 noninh( -~ opened, X, S) ~ subseteq( { open} ,X ) , 
may_imm_cause( { open} ,opened, S) , 
not cancels({open}, X, opened, S) c 7rfO 3 
Z4 noninh (opened, X, S) ~ subset({ close}, X ) , 
may_imm_cause( { close}, -, opened, S), 
not cancels( {close} , X, -1 opened, S) 
By instantiating Z4 with X = {open, close} we obtain the clause: 
noninh( opened, {open, close}, S) 
Similarly, from Z3 we obtain the clause 
noninh( ~ opened, {open, close}, S) 
Hence, neither holds(opened, [{open, close}]) nor -~ holds(opened, [{open, close}]) can 
be derived from 7rfO 3 using (4b). From Proposition 3.1 and consistency of ~fD 3 
we can conclude that it is unknown if "opened" holds or does not hold in 
[{ open, close}]. 
Notice also that our program neither entails holds(painted, [{open, close, paint}]) 
(a translation of the v-proposition painted after {open, close, paint}) nor entails 
holds(painted, [{open, close, paint}]). 
Notice that {open, close, paint} is not executable in models of D. This explains 
the executability condition in the Soundness Theorem. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper merges ideas from several areas of research and depends ubstantially 
on many results in all of these areas. This makes a complete description of related 
work a difficult if not an impossible task. We would not even attempt to accomplish 
this task here. Instead, we mention only the work which had direct and immediate 
influence on us. We hope it will help the reader to better understand the proper 
place this paper occupies in a large puzzle we, together with many other people, 
are trying to solve. 
Introduction of the language ~a~" c and its semantics is part of an attempt o 
develop a framework for systematic development of theories of actions and their 
effects. There is a large body of work on formalization of reasoning about actions 
which differ substantially in ontology of actions, in logics (monotonic and non- 
monotonic) used for the formalizations, and in the degree of precision and 
generality attempted by the authors. A typical paper on the subject described a 
modification of the old (or, possibly an entirely new) approach and illustrates its 
utility by representing several "canonical" examples, such as the blocks world or 
the "Yale Shooting" story and its enhancements. Competing approaches were 
evaluated and compared mostly by their ability to represent knowledge from these 
examples and by the elegance of the corresponding representations. This method- 
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ology proved to be very fruitful. It sharpened our understanding of common-sense 
reasoning about actions and led to substantial advances in theories of nonmono- 
tonic logics and logic programming. At the same time it left researchers with a 
great diversity of methods of representation without providing them with a flame- 
work for outlining ranges of applicability of these methods and their advantages 
and disadvantages. The diversity reflects the difficulty and richness of the problem 
and is probably unavoidable, but we hope that the development of such a unifying 
framework will help to structure the multitude of different formalisms and to make 
this diversity manageable. This of course could only happen if such a framework is 
based on clear mathematical grounds and helps to facilitate mathematical nalysis 
and comparison of different methods of representation. 
There are several recent publications, including [Rei91, Rei92, San94, GL92] 
which attempt he development of such a framework. The attempts differ in scope 
and methods but share a large number of basic assumptions. 
Our work is based on the approach originated in [GL92]. That paper introduces 
a high-level action description language 5g, gives its semantics based on the notion 
of an automata, and outlines the approach of using entailment relations in action 
description languages for proving properties of various formalisms for modeling 
reasoning about actions. We hope that by now the connections between [GL92] 
and the present paper are obvious. 
The Toronto group 7 and some others [Elk92] base their unifying framework on 
the language of situation calculus [McC59] and its extensions (see for instance 
[GLR91], [PR93] and [Elk92]) as the means of expressing knowledge about actions 
and their effects, and classical ogic as the means of formalization of reasoning. 
In further work [Rei93, LLL, Pin94] the simple ontology of situation calculus is 
enriched by introducing complex actions, actual time line, nondeterministic a tions, 
etc. Effects of actions are described by a collection of axioms written in the syntax 
of first-order logic. The inertial property of the corresponding dynamical system is 
described by the so called successor state axioms which determine necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a property to hold after the execution of an action. This 
approach provides a solution to the Frame Problem which, though limited in scope, 
is elegant and applicable to a large class of dynamical systems. 
Sandewall [San92, San94] concentrates on the development of a model of reality 
as a dynamical system viewed as a game between an ego and the world. The rules 
of the game are determined by the Ego-World Semantics. The semantics is used to 
describe a taxonomy of dynamical systems which is applied to the analysis of 
several nonmonotonic (mainly preferred models based) formalisms for representing 
actions. Unfortunately, the detailed description of the approach (soon to appear in 
the book) is not yet available to the authors which precludes erious comments on 
its strengths and weaknesses, s 
All three approaches enjoyed considerable attention in the last few years. Initial 
frameworks were extended to include richer ontologies and several ogical formal- 
7 The group at the University of Toronto consists of Reiter, Pinto, Lin, Levesque, Lesperance, 
Marcu and Scherl and has many recent works on this topic [PR93, Pin94, LR94, LR95, LLL, SL93]. 
s It seems however that the Sandewall's approach shares many underlying assumptions with that 
from [GL92] and Reiter's [Rei91]. In particular, the dynamical systems under considerations are inertial. 
On the other hand, the basic ontology of [San92] seems to be built on the notion of actual time line and 
hence does not allow hypothetical reasoning easily expressible in two other frameworks. 
EFFECTS OF CONCURRENT ACTIONS 105 
izations were evaluated and compared w.r.t, them. The relation between the 
frameworks i not yet well understood (see, however, Kartha [Kar93] and Theis- 
chler [Thi94]). The Toronto group's approach and the approach based on ~¢ share 
the same view of a dynamic world based on the situation calculus model. The 
difference is in the type of language used to describe actions and in the type of 
logic associated with this language. The former uses general purpose classical ogic 
while the latter prefers a special purpose, high level language with nonmonotonic, 
specialized semantics. The main challenge of the Toronto group's approach then is 
to find proper collections of axioms describing the corresponding ontology, while 
for us the problem is rather to describe a class of models defining the proper 
entailment relation. We pay for the simplicity of the language by the necessity to 
develop this new semantics. We believe that the two approaches shall not be 
viewed as rivals but rather as mutually complimentary ways to study the same 
entailment relations. Future research will show if this is a right assessment. 
The second theme of the paper is centered around the question of applicability 
of logic programming languages to representing knowledge about actions. The 
early attempts on such representation include Eshghi and Kowalski [EK89], Evans 
[Eva89], Apt and Bezem [AB90], among others. These formalizations used the 
language of general logic programs and therefore assumed the closed world 
assumption about all predicates. Formalization i  the language of extended logic 
programs which has no such limitation was suggested in [GL92] and also in [Mi195], 
The formalization i  [GL92] extends the previous uggestion by Apt and Bezem 
[AB90] and is shown to be sound w.r.t, semantics of ~¢. This work was generalized 
to achieve complete formalization of domain descriptions in ~¢ in the languages of 
extended logic programs with disjunctions [Tur94], abductive [DDS93, Dun93] and 
equational logic programming [HT93] respectively. In [BG93] we describe a first 
attempt at generalizing these programs to the dynamic systems with compound 
actions. In this paper we extend our approach in [BG93]. We hope our work 
illustrates how the use of action description languages and their semantics facili- 
tates rigorous reasoning about various formalizations, allows to gradually strengthen 
them, and to investigate the relations between different approaches. 
The last theme, related to the treatment of concurrency in the language of 
situation calculus follows the lines suggested in [GLR91]. A paper addressing the 
possibility of expressing the results of concurrent actions in situation calculus is 
[LS92]. The important difference is in the choice of the formalisms--the nonmono- 
tonic approach of [LS92] uses two different non-monotonic logics--circumscription 
and default logic. In contrast our approaches use single formalisms of domain 
descriptions or that of logic programs. There are some other differences: for 
instance, in Example 3 expanded by a v-proposition "initially open", the formalism 
of Lin and Shoham uses inertia to entail holds(open,[{open, close}]) while we 
believe that "unknown" (produced by our systems) is the more intuitive answer. 
Nevertheless, to capture Lin and Shoham's intuition we need to redefine the 
definition of models by requiring that 
qb(o-, [al . . . . .  a,]) = o- when E+n 
In the translation we need to add the 
holds( F, res( A,  S) ) ,-- holds( F, S) 
E -~O.  
following rules. 
, noninh( A,  F, S), undefined( A, S) 
--n holds( F, res( A,  S ) ) ~ ~ holds(F, S ) , noninh( A,  F, S ) , undefined( A,  S ) . 
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Another approach would be to randomly choose from the intersection of E ÷ and 
E , and have the translation such that each answer set corresponds to a particular 
choice. 
The nice feature of Lin and Shoham's formalization is the so called epistemolog- 
ical completeness of their system [LS91] for deterministic actions. Intuitively, a 
theory of a (deterministic) action is epistemologically complete if, given a complete 
description of the initial situation, the theory enables us to predict a complete 
description of the resulting situation when the action is performed. Since some of 
our actions are not executable we cannot expect o have precisely this property but 
with respect o the naturally modified notion our formalisms are epistemologically 
complete. In other words, it can be easily shown that given a complete description 
of the initial situation, our theory enables us to predict a complete description of 
the resulting situation when a sequence of executable actions is performed. 
Another recent paper addressing the possibility of expressing the results of 
concurrent actions in situation calculus is [ALP94]. The approach in [ALP94] 
allows concurrent executions of different instances of the same action and treats 
"concurrency" from the program execution point of view. It formalizes the notion 
that if f is true after executing action a followed by action b and also true after 
executing action b followed by action a then f can be assume to be true 
concurrently executing a and b. It seems that such a formalization will not be able 
to express the effect of executing l i f i_l and l i f i r  concurrently as described in 
Example 2. But more study is necessary to further compare the approach in 
[ALP94] with our approach. 
There are of course many open questions left in all of the three directions of 
research outlined above. In the nearest future we plan to concentrate on two of 
them: direct extension of the previous work by developing extensions of ~¢c to 
allow representation of knowledge about dynamical systems with richer ontologies 
and building provably correct logic programs describing the corresponding entail- 
ment relations; discovering methods to use these declarative programs to automa- 
tize various forms of reasoning utilizing this knowledge. 
APPENDIX: PROOFS 
In this we prove the theorems tated in the earlier sections. First, let us notice that 
observation 3.2 holds for 7r'D and 7rfD. Hence, in this section we only consider the 
partially evaluated 7rD, 7r'D and 7rfD w.r.t. Lit({atomic, subset, subseteq, eq}). 
Lemma 5.1. Let II be an extended logic program, ~ be a set of  disjunctions and A be 
a set ofliterals. I f for  every disjunction of  the form a 1 or . . .  or a n in ~,  there exists 
an i such that a i E A , then II U ~ U A and II U A have the same answer sets. 
PROOF. Follows immediately from the definition of answer sets. [] 
Proposition 5.4. 1. Let D be a domain description. The logic programs (Tr'D) +, and 
(zrfD)÷ 9 are locally stratified [Prz88]. 
9 For an extended logic program II the normal logic program II + denotes the program obtained by 
replacing each occurrence ofa literals ~ l in H by l'. See [GL90] for relation between answer sets of an 
extended logic program II and the stable models of the corresponding ormal logic program II*. 
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2. I f  D is a domain description without any v-propositions then the program ~r D is 
locally stratified. [] 
PROOF (sketch). For a sequence of actions a = a~,.. . ,  a m its level is defined as the 
pair (m,k )  where k is [am[, the cardinality of  am. We say (m,k )<(m' ,k ' )  iff 
m<m'  or m=m'  and k<k ' .  
It is easy to see that any assignment of  strata to atoms which satisfies the 
following conditions gives us a local stratification: 
(i) For atoms holds(f,[~]) and holds(f,[a'])  where a and a '  are sequence of 
actions, if level( a') < level( a ) then strata(holds( f ,[ a'])) < strata(holds(f , 
[ ~ ])). 
(ii) strata(holds +( f , [ a ])) = strata(cause(a, f ,  [ a ])) = strata(cancels(X, Y f ,  [ a ])) 
< strata(may imm cause(a ,  f ,  [ a ])) = strata(noninherit(f, X [ a ])) = strata 
(undefined(a, [ a ])) < strata(holds +( f , [ a lb ])). [] 
Lemma 5.2. Let D be a domain description and let A be a set of literals in the language 
of reD. A is a consistent answer set of 1r D iff A is the consistent answer set of 
[ rrD ]A = rrD U {holds(f,  So): holds(f ,  So) cA}  
U {--1 holds(f ,  So) : -7 holds(f ,  So) cA} .  
PROOF. Let P = {p:p  is a v-proposition in D}, and let D '= D\  P. 
Let A be a consistent answer set of  ~-D. It is easy to see that A is a consistent 
answer set of  (TrD') A and A satisfies the constraints ~rP. It is easy to see that if a 
program II  does not contain not, then if A is an answer set of  I I  then A is an 
answer set of  I IUB  for any BoA.  Hence, A is a consistent answer set of  
([TrD'].~) n. Therefore, by definition A is a consistent answer set of  ([rrD']A). The 
program ([TrD']A) + is locally stratified and by Lemma 5.1 we can eliminate the 
disjunctions in it without effecting the answers sets and therefore it has a unique 
answer set which is also the unique answer set of  ([TrD]A) +. Hence, A is the 
consistent answer set of  [7"rD] A. 
¢=: 
Let A be the consistent answer set of  [7"rD] A. It is easy to see that A satisfies 
(7"rD) A. Suppose ,4 is not the minimal set that satisfies (TrD) ~. Let A' cA  satisfy 
(TrD) A. (case 1) A and A' differ on facts about the initial state. 
Consider the case when holds(f, s o) ~A and holds(f, s 0) ~A ' .  (The arguments 
for the other case is similar.) But then, since either holds(f, So) CA'  or 
-7 holds(f, s o) ~ A' we conclude that -7 holds(f, s o) ~ A'. By consistency of  A we 
have -7 holds(f, s o) ~A.  This contradicts our assumption that A' cA .  
(case 2) A and A' do not differ on facts about the initial state. But then A' will 
satisfy ([77"D]A)A contradicting our assumption that A is an answer set of  [TrD]n. 
Hence, A is the minimal set that satisfies (TrD) A and therefore is an answer set 
of  ~D.  [] 
Lemma 5.3. Let D be a domain description. M = (o-0, ~)  is a model of D iff M is the 
model of D M = D U (initially f : f  ~ ~o} U {initially -~ f : f  ~ ~ro}. 
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PROOF. 
Let  M=(~o,~)  be a model of D. It is easy to see that M is a model of D u .  We 
now need to show that it is the only model D M. Suppose M'  :~ M is also a model of 
D. It is clear that M'  and M only differ in the initial state. But then M'  cannot 
satisfy the v-propositions about the initial state in D M. Hence, M is the only model 
of D M. 
¢:== 
Obvious. [] 
We now introduce some notations for the forthcoming proofs. 
Notation 
1. We denote the situation [a 1 . . . . .  a n] by s n and the state M (a, ..... a,) by cr n. 
2. A set of fluent literals p = {Pl . . . . .  Pn} is said to hold in a state cr if every Pi 
holds in tr. Otherwise, we say that p does not hold in o-. 
3. For a set of fluent literals p = {Pl . . . . .  Pn} we denote the set {h(p l ,  s ) , . . . ,  
h (pn,  s)} by n(p ,  s). 
4. We denote the set of fluent atoms, {f :a  immediately causes f in o-} by 
direct + ( a, or). 
5. We denote the set of fluent atoms, {f :a  immediately causes f in o-} by 
direct-(  a, or). 
6. We denote the set of fluent atoms, {f : a inherits the effect f from its subsets 
in o-} by inherited+ ( a, or). 
7. We denote the set of fluent atoms, {f : a inherits the effect f from its subsets 
in o" } by inherited- ( a, cr ). 
Note that, E+(a ,  or) = direct+(a, o') U inherited+(a, or) and E- (a ,  o-) = 
d i rect - (a ,  cr ) t.; inherited (a,  or). 
Lemma 5.4 (Models of D vs Answer sets of 7rD). Let  M = (o- 0, cI)) be a model  o f  D 
and A be a consistent answer set o f  7r D such that tr 0 = {f: holds( f ,  s o) ~ A}. 
1. I f  a I . . . . .  a ,  is executable in M then 
( a ) f ~ direct + ( a n , o- n_ 1) i f f  may- imm -cause(  a n , f__, s n - 1) ~ A .  
(b) f ~ direct- (a n , ~r n_ 1) i f f  may_ imm _cause(a  n, f ,  s n _ 1) ~ A .  
( c ) f ~ inherited + ( a n , tr n _ 1) i f f  noninh( f , a n, s n _ 1) ~ A .  
( d ) f ~ inherited- (a n, o'n 1) i f f  noninh( f ,  a n, Sn - 1 ) E A .  
(e) undefined(a n,s n _ 1) f~ A .  
( f )  f ~ cr n ¢* ho lds ( f ,  sn) cA .  
(g)  f q~ cr n ,~ --1 ho lds ( f ,  sn) cA .  
2. I f  a I . . . . .  a n is not executable in M then holds( f ,  s n) q~ A and -1 holds( f ,  s n) ~ A 
and undefined(a n,s n_ l) ~ A .  [] 
PROOF. We will prove this theorem using induction on the level of sequence of 
actions. 
Base case: level = (0, 0) 
Directly from the conditions of the theorem. 
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Induction Hypothesis: level < (n, m) 
Let us assume that by IH  
1. If a I . . . . .  a h is executable in M then 
(a) f ~ direct + ( a h , tr h _ 1) iff may_  imm _ cause( ah , f ,  s k _ l) ~ A .  
(b) f ~ direct- (a h, o- h _ 1) iff may_ imm _cause(  a h, f ,  s h_ 1 ) ~ A .  
(c) f ~ inherited+ (ah, o" h_ 1) iff noninh( f , a~, s k_ 1) ~ A .  
(d) f ~ inherited- ( a h , o" h_ 1) iff noninh( f , a h , s k_ 1) ~A.  
(e) undefined( a h, s k_ 1) CA .  
(f) f ~ o" h ~ ho lds( f ,  s k) ~A.  
(g) f f~ (r k ,~ -7 ho lds( f ,  s k) ~ A .  
2. I f  a 1 . . . . .  a k is not executable in M then for any fluent atom f ,  ho lds( f ,  s h) f~A 
and ~ holds( f ,  s h) CA  and undefined(a h, s h_ 1) ~A.  
Induction: level = (n, m) 
1. Let a~ . . . . .  a n be executable in M. Then, 
(a) f ~ direct+(an, tr n_ 1 ) 
iff 
there is an e-proposition (a n causes f if p )  in D such that p holds in 
°'n 1 (by definition) 
iff 
H (p ,  s n _ 1 ) c A (by IH) 
iff 
may_ imm_cause(an , f ,  sn_ l )~A (By consistency of  A, rule (3a) and 
Proposition 3.1). 
(b) similar to 1 (a). 
(c) f ~ inherited+(an, ~r n_ 1) 
iff 
there exists an e-proposition b causes f if q in D such that q holds in 
sn 1 and b c an, such that for all c, b c c _ a n, if there is an e-proposition 
c causes f if r in D then r does not hold in s n_ 1 (by definition) 
iff 
f~d i rec t+(b ,  On_ 1) and re  trn_ 1 iff 
may_ immcause(b , f ,  s ,_  1) ~A and H(r ,  s n_ 1) q:A (by IH) 
iff 
may imm_cause(b ,  f ,  s , _  1) ~ A and cancels(b, an, f ,  s n _ 1) ~ A (Using 
consistency of A and applying Proposition 3.1 to rules (4c) and (3b).) 
iff 
non inh( f ,  a n, s ,_  1) ~A.  (By applying Proposition 3.1 to rule (4d)) 
(d) similar to 1 (c). 
(e) a I . . . . .  a n is executable in M =, 
E+( an, ~rn_ l) N E - (  an, crn_ l) = O 
direct+(an, Crn 1) (~ direct-(an,  ~rn- 1) = Q5 and 
inherited+(an, o- n _ 1 ) f'-) inherited-(an, o- n _ 1 ) = ~ =~ 
There does not exist f such that both may_ imm_cause(an ,  f s n 1) and 
may_ immcause(an ,  f ,  sn_ 1) are in A, and there does not exist f such 
that both non inh( f ,  a n, s n_ 1) and non inh( f ,  a n, s n 1) are in A (Using l(a) 
to l(d) of Lemma 5.4.) 
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(f) 
undefined( an, sn_ 1) CA  (Using Proposition 3.1 on rules (3d) and (4e) of 
the program.) 
Let f ~ o" n ==# 
f~o'n_ lUE+(an,~rn 1) \E-(an,° 'n 1) 
At least one of the following cases is true. 
i. a n is atomic and f~  o '~_ l \E - (an ,  o'n-l) 
ii. a n is not atomic and f ~ o- n l \ E+(an, o'n l ) \E - (an ,° 'n -1  )
iii. f ~ direct+( an, ~rn_ I) 
iv. a n is not atomic and f~  inherited+ ( an, ~rn- 1) \E - (an ,  °'n- 1) 
i. a n is atomic and f ~ ~rn-l \ E - (an,  ~rn 1) 
holds(f, s n_ 1) ~ A (by IH) and may_imm_cause(  an, f , Sn -'l ) CA  
(by l(b)) and undefined(an, sn_ l )CA  (by l(e)) 
holds(f, s n) ~A (by using Proposition 3.1 on rule (la). Note that we 
can use rule ( la) only because a n is atomic.). 
+ a ii. an is not atomic and f~ ~r n I \E  ( ,, ~rn 1 ) \E - (an ,  crn-1) 
=:~ 
From f ~ E+(an, o'~ l) and re2 E-(an,  o" n_ 1) we can conclude that 
there exists an atomic action b in a n such that there is no effect 
axioms of the form b causes f if p where p holds in s n_ l; It is easy 
to see that b is executable in ~rn_ 1 and f~ ~(b,o'n_l) .  By IH this 
implies that holds(f, res( b , s n_ 1)) ~ A. From f q~ inherited- ( a n , o-~ _ 1) 
using l(d) we can conclude that 
noninh(f, an,s n 1)flA. By l (e )we have undefined(an,Sn_l)f ~A. 
Hence using Proposition 3.1 on the rule (4a) we can conclude that 
holds(f, s n) ~ A. 
iii. f ~direct+(an,~n 1) 
may_ imm_cause(an, f ,  sn 1) ~A (from l(a)) 
cause(an, f ,  sn-1) ~A (By IH and Proposition 3.1 applied to rules (3a) 
and (3b)) 
holds(f, s n) ~A (Using l(e) and applying Proposition 3.1 to rule (3c)). 
iv. a n is not atomic and f ~ inherited + ( a n, °'n - 1 ) \  E -  ( a ~, ~r n_ 1) 
=:~ 
From f~  inherited+ ( an, o-~ ~) it is easy to show that, there exists an 
action bcan such that a l , . . . ,an_ l ,  b is executable and f~ 
direct+(b, crn_l); from which we can conclude by (iii) that 
holds(f, res(b, s~ _ l )) ~ A. From f ~ E -  (a n, °'n - 1 ) we can conclude (by 
l(d)) that noninh(f, an,sn 1)CA.  Hence, using Proposition 3.1, l(e) 
and rule (4a) we can conclude that holds(f, s n) ~A.  
Let holds(f, s~) ~ A 
By Proposition 3.1 at-least one of the following three cases must be true. 
(Note that undefined(an, sn 1)q~A in all the three cases) 
i. holds(f, s, 1) ~ A, a n is atomic and may_imm_cause(  an, f ,  sn - 1) q~ 
A. (Using rule (la)) 
ii. There exists an e-proposition (an causes f if p), such that H(p ,  s n 1) 
cA .  (Using rule (3c)). 
iii. There exists an action b ca  n such that holds(f, res(b, sn_ l ) )~A and 
noninh(f, a n, sn 1) CA .  (using rule (4a)). 
i. By IH, holds(f, sn_l) ~A implies f~  O'n_ 1- 
From may_ imm_cause(An,  f ,  sn- 1) CA  using l(b) we can conclude 
EFFECTS OF CONCURRENT ACTIONS 111 
. 
ii. 
111. 
that f ~ direct-  ( a n, s n _ 1 ). Since a n is atomic, inherited- ( a n, s n _ 1) = O. 
Hence, f ~ E (an, s n _ 1)" Hence, f ~ o- n. 
There exists an e-proposition (a n causes  f if p), such that H(p ,  s n_ 1) 
cA .  By IH we have p holds in ~,_~. Hence, f~E+(an ,sn_ l ) .  Since, 
a~ . . . . .  a n is executable we have that fq~E- (an ,sn_ l ) .  Hence, f~  tr n. 
There exists an action b ca  n such that ho lds ( f ,  res(b, sn_~) )~A and 
noninh(  f , an, s n _ 1) f~ A . 
We will first show that f~d i rec t - (an ,  trn_~). Suppose it is not the 
case. Then using the arguments imilar to (iii) of (=, )  we will have 
-1 ho lds ( f ,  s n) ~A.  This makes A inconsistent and we have a contra- 
diction. 
From, noninh(  f , a n, s n _ 1 )CA we conclude (using l(d)) 
f ~ inher i ted-(an,  o'n - 1). Hence, f ~ E - (a , ,  0"  n _ 1). 
From holds( f ,  res(b, s n 1 ) )~A using IH we can conclude that f~  
tr,_ 1 or f~E+(b ,o 'n_ l ) .  If  f~t r , _  1, then since we showed f~ 
E- (an ,  cry_ 1), we have f~ o- n. 
Now suppose f~E+(b ,  trn_l)\O'n_ 1. This means there exists an ac- 
tion b l ca  n such that f~d i rec t÷(b l ,  O'n_l). Le t  b e be the maximal 
subaction of  a n such that f~  d i rect÷(bz,  trn_l); i.e., there does not 
exist an action c ,b  2 cc  ~a n such that f~d i rec t+(c ,~rn_ l ) .  We now 
claim that 
(*) for all actions g, b z cg  can ,  if (g causes f if q) in D then q does 
not hold in ~r n 1. 
Suppose our claim is false. Then there exists an action g, b 2 cg  ___an, 
such that f~  d i rect - (g ,  tr n_ 1). From maximality of b e we have f~ 
inherited- ( a n, tr n_ ~ ). By l(d) we have noninh(  f , a n, s , _  t) ~A.  This 
contradicts our original assumption that 
noninh(  f ,  an, s n _ 1 ) ~ A.  Hence our claim (*) is true. 
Therefore, by definition f~  E+(an,  o" n_ 1) and hence f~ o n. 
(g) Similar to the proof  of  l(f). 
a 1 . . . . .  a n is not executable 
There are two cases: 
(case 1) al . . . .  , an_ ~ is executable. 
(case 2) al . . . . .  an-1 is not executable. 
(case 1) E+(an,  O-n_ l )OE  (an, O'n_l)4=O 
(case 1.1) direct + ( a n , o-,_ t) (~ direct-  ( a , , on_ 1) ~ 0 or 
(case 1.2) inherited+(an, o" n_ 1) (3 inher i ted-(  an, o- n 1) v~ O 
(The other two cases are not possible.) 
(case 1.1) direct+(an, o'n_ l) f3d i rect - (an ,  o'n_ l) ~ O 
Similar to the case 1 (a) we can show that for some f ,  
may- imm-cause(  an, f ,  sn-  1) ~ A and may_ imm_cause(a ,  f ,  s n 1) ~ A 
undef ined(a n, s n) ~ A (by rule (3d).) 
(case 1.2) inher i ted+(an,~rn_ l ) f3 inher i ted (an, o 'n_ l )4 :O  
There exists a, a' ca  n such that f ~ direct+ (a, O'n ~), f ~ d i rect - (  a', o" n 1), and 
there does not exist b and b' where acbc_a  n, a 'cb 'c_a  n, f~  
direct-  ( b, o" n _ 1 ) and f ~ direct ÷ ( b', tr n _ 1 ). 
Similar to the case 1 (a) we can show that may imrncause(a , f ,  s n_ 1 )~A,  
may_ imm_cause(  a', f , s n _ 1) ~ A ,  cancels(a,  an, f ,  s n_ 1) CA and 
cancels(a',  an, f ,  s n 1) CA.  By using (4d) and Proposition 3.1 we have 
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noninh( f , a,, s, _ l) cA  and noninh( f , a,, s,_ 1) cA  
undefined(a,, s , )~A (by Proposition 3.1 and rules (4e).). 
(case 2) Using IH and rule (3e) we get undefined(a,, s ) cA .  
Since for any jr, all rules with either holds(f, s,) or --1 holds(f, s,) in their 
head, have not undefined( a,, s,_ 1) in their body, ho lds ( f , s , )~A and 
holds(f, s,) q~ A. 
This ends the proof of this lemma. [] 
Lemma 5.5. For every model M = (or0, ~)  of a consistent domain description D, there 
exists a consistent answer set A of zr D such that o" o = { f : holds( f ,  s o) cA}.  
PROOF. Consider D' = D\  the set of v-proposition in D and [7r'D']~o = zr'D' U 
{holds(f, so) : f ~ A} U { -~ holds(f, s o) : f E A}. It is easy to see that M is a model of 
D'. Since, ([Tr'D']~0)+ is locally stratified and contains complete information about 
the initial state by Lemma 5.1 the disjunctions (about the initial state) in it can be 
ignored without affecting its answer sets, and hence ( [ z rD ' ] )+ will have a unique ~0 
answer set, say A +. We will first show that A + is coherent. 1° Incoherency is 
possible if we derive both holds(F, S) and holds'(F, S) from ([zrD']~0)+. holds(F, S) 
can be derived using (la), (3c) and (4a) and holds'(F, S) can be derived using (lb), 
(3c) and (4b). Using induction on the level of S, it can be easily shown that 
(i) the bodies of ( la) and (lb) cannot be true at the same time. 
(ii) the bodies of ( la) and (3c) cannot be true at the same time, because if the 
body of (3c) is true then the atom with may_imm_cause will become true 
making the body of ( la) false. 
(iii) the bodies of ( la) and (4b) cannot be true at the same time, because ( la) is 
applicable only for atomic actions, while (4b) needs the action to be 
non-atomic. 
(iv) the bodies of (3c) and (lb) cannot be true at the same time. (Similar 
reason as in (ii).) 
(v) We cannot have both holds(f, s) and holds'(f, s) derived using (3c) be- 
cause in that case undefined will block the derivation of both. 
(vi) the bodies of (3c) and (4b) cannot be true at the same time, because if the 
body of (3c) is true then the atom with noninh will become true making 
the body of (4b) false. 
(vii) the bodies of (4a) and (lb) cannot be true at the same time. (Similar 
reason as in (iii).) 
(viii) the bodies of (4a) and (3c) cannot be true at the same time, (similar reason 
as in (vi)) 
(ix) the bodies of (4a) and (4b) cannot be true at the same time, because 
noninh will block the derivation of at-least one of them. 
Hence, A + is coherent and hence [GL91] A is consistent and is the unique answer 
set of [zrD']~0. 
From Lemma 5.2 it is easy to see that A is a consistent answer set of zrD'. 
Using, Lemma 5.4 w.r.t. D' we have that A and M agree on all v-propositions in
~°A+ is coherent iff there does not exist an atom l, such that both l and l' are in A +. For an ELP 
II, consistency of answer set of H corresponds tothe coherence of answer sets of H +. 
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D. Since, M is a model of  D, M satisfies all v-propositions in D and therefore A 
must satisfy the constraints in 7rD. Hence, A is an answer set of  ~-D. [] 
Lemma 5. 6. Let D be a consistent domain description. For every consistent answer set 
A o f  7rD there exists a model M = (~ro, ~)  o f  D such that o- 0 = {f :  holds(f,  s o) ~ A}. 
PROOF. Let D'=D\  the set of  v-propositions in D. Let [D'] A =D'U{ in i t ia l l y  
f :  holds(f ,  s o) ~ A} U {initially --1 f :  holds(f ,  s o) ~ A}. It is easy to see that [ D'] A is 
consistent and has a unique model with the initial state o- 0. Let M = (~r 0, qb) be the 
model of [D'] A. From Lemma 5.3 it is easy to see that M is a model of  D'. Since A 
is a consistent answer set of  7rD, it is easy to see that A is a consistent answer set 
of  ~D' .  Using, Lemma 5.4 w.r.t. D'  we have that A and M agree on all 
v-propositions. Since, A is an answer set of  7rD, A satisfies the translations of  all 
v-propositions of  D in ~D and therefore M must satisfy all v-propositions of D. 
Hence, M is a model of D. [] 
Theorem 5.1 (Soundness and completeness of 7r). Let D be an arbitrary domain 
description and P =f  after a l , . . . ,  a n be any v-proposition in the language of  D 
such that a 1 . . . . .  a n is executable in any model o f  D. Then 7r D ~ h( f , [  a 1 . . . .  ,an]) 
iff D~P.  
PROOF. Directly from Lemma 5.4, Lemma 5.5 and Lemma 5.6. [] 
Now we will prove properties of  the translation 7r'. 
Lemma 5. 7. Let D be a consistent domain description. Let  M = (tr0, ~)  be a model o f  
D. Then there exists a consistent answer set A o f  7r'D such that: 
I f  a l , . . . ,  a n is executable in M then 
fc  di~(an, [al . . . .  , an-1 ]) ~ holds( f ,  [a l , . . . ,  a n ]) ~ A 
f~ dO(an, [al . . . .  , an-1 ]) ~ ~ holds( f ,  [a~ . . . . .  an]) ~A 
otherwise, holds(f ,  [a 1 . . . . .  a ~ ]) q~ A and ~ holds(f ,  [a I . . . . .  a n ]) ~ A 
PROOF. From Lemma 5.5 and the observation that answer set of  7rD are answer 
sets of  ~-'D. [] 
Theorem 5.2 (Soundness of zr'). Let D be an arbitrary domain description and P =f  
after al , . . .  , a n be any v-proposition in the language of  D such that a I . . . . .  a n is 
executable in any model o f  D. I f  zr'D ~ zr'P then D ~ P. 
PROOF. Directly from Lemma 5.7. [] 
The following lemmas are needed to prove a completeness result of  1r'D w.r.t. 
D. 
Lemma 5.8. Let  H be a consistent extended logic program, such that H + is locally 
stratified and for  all atoms p, both p and p' belong to the same strata. Then if  H ~ 1 
then H u i is inconsistent. 
Lemma 5.9. For every model M = ((r 0, qb) of  a consistent domain description D, there 
exists a consistent answer set A o f  zr'D such that tr 0 = {f :  holds(f,  s o) ~ A}. 
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PROOF. Similar to Lemma 5.5. [] 
Lemma 5.10. Let D be an well-founded omain description and let S = {holds(f, 
[a 1 . . . . .  an]) : a 1 . . . .  , a n are associated with D} U { -1 holds(f ,  [a l , . . . ,  an]) : a 1 . . . . .  a, 
are associated with D}. Let D' = D\  the u-proposition in D. 
(1) All  answer sets of  7r'D' are complete w.r.t. S. (note 7rD' is the same as 7r'D') 
(2) Let A be a set of  literals such that for the fluent f either holds(f ,  s o) ~A or 
-1 holds( f ,s  o) ~A.  A is the consistent answer set of  [Tr'D'] A and for all 
v-propositions p in D, 7r' p ~ A iff 
A is the consistent answer set of  [If'D] A 
PROOF. (1) From well-foundedness of D and Lemma 5.4. 
(2) Local stratification guarantees that both [Tr'D'] A and [Tr'D] A have unique 
answer sets. 
Obvious 
~Because  of the uniqueness of answer sets of [~r'D'] A and [Tr'D]~ it is sufficient 
if we show that the answer set of [7"r'D'] A is the answer set of  [~r'D]~. Let B be the 
answer set of [Tr'D'] A. Suppose B does not satisfy l = 7r'p, for some v-proposition 
p ~ D. Since by part (1) B is complete w.r.t. S, we have [Tr'O'] A ~ L Using Lemma 
5.8 we have [Tr'D] A to  be inconsistent. But by Lemma 5.9 we have [Tr'D]A to  be 
consistent. Hence, we have a contradiction and our assumption about B not 
satisfying l = ~-'p, for some v-proposition p ~ D is wrong. Hence, for all v-proposi- 
tion p ~ D, 7r'p E B. Hence, B is the answer set of [Tr'D]A. [] 
Theorem 5.3. For any consistent well-founded omain description D the programs 7r D 
and rc'D have the same answer sets. 
PROOF. A is a consistent answer set of 7r'D iff 
A is the consistent answer set of [Tr'D] A (By reasoning similar to Lemma 5.2) 
iff 
A is the consistent answer set of [7"r'D'] A and for all v-propositions p in D, 
7r'p ~A (From part (2) of Lemma 5.10) iff 
A is the consistent answer set of [TrD'] A and for all v-propositions p in D, ~-'p ~A 
(Since 7rD' and 7r'D' are the same) iff 
A is the consistent answer set of [TrD] A (Since A satisfies all the constraints) iff 
A is a consistent answer set of 7rD. (By Lemma 5.2.) [] 
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